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Habit Beyond Psychology




1 Psychologists would often attribute the success or failure of our everyday behavior to
the  habits  we  develop  throughout  our  lives.  Walking,  eating  or  even  speaking  are
acquired habits, whereas physiological processes like breathing or even the ability to
think – inherent habits or instincts. Beyond the level of the individual, all conventions
of society and moral values signaling the emergence of civilization can be analyzed into
elements, which form a structural equivalent to the habits of a single person. Since it is
possible  to  approach  a  given  multitude  such  as  a  congestion  of  atoms  or  a  social
community  as  an individual,  nothing surprising  emerges  out  of  these  propositions:
there is no immediate reason to doubt the effects of habit. However, this does not make
an explanation of the phenomenon redundant. In the following text I reexamine the
connotations of the term habit from the perspective of Peirce’s pragmatism. I start by
tracing back the roots of the term in the Metaphysical Club’s discussions of Alexander
Bain’s theory of belief. By stressing the relative overlap between belief and habit I am also
proposing  that  the  latter  term  transcends  the  boundaries  of  empirical  psychology.
Peirce’s well-known antipathy to psychologism in logic raised the status of habit to a
universal concept that participates in the unlimited process of interpretation. Habit,
therefore, falls into a new lineage of meaning that can be traced back to antiquity and
turns into a generative notion with extensive connotations. As a result it becomes an
inseparable part of Peirce architectonic philosophy, capable to shed new light on his
evolutionary cosmology and metaphysics. Conceiving of habit as an operative element
in the evolution of all phenomena in the universe is the main objective of this article.
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Peirce’s Anti-Psychologism
2 Pragmatism was never a fully  integrated philosophical  theory and Arthur Lovejoy’s
article “The Thirteen Pragmatisms” published in 1908 is an apt illustration. In roughly
a decade after William James introduced the term to a wider audience in his lecture
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical  Results” (1898) the first  genuine American
contribution to philosophy sprouted into an abundance of directions. In the first years
of the 20th century, pragmatism gained followers not only in the US but also in Europe.
Notable  ‘niches’  of  the  new doctrine  emerged  in  the  UK with  the  work  of  Francis
Canning  Scot  Schiller  (1864-1937),  the  Florentine  School  in  Italy,  represented  by
Giovanni  Papini  (1881-1956),  Giuseppe  Prezzolini  (1882-1982),  Giovanni  Vailati
(1863-1909)  and  Mario  Calderoni  (1879-1914),  and  even  on  the  Balkans  with  the
undeservedly forgotten Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Sarailiev (1887-1969). The works of
the  latter  might  have  exercised  a  greater  impact,  if  they  were  not  written  almost
exclusively in Bulgarian and if they were not “heavily suppressed by the communists
after  they  gained  power  in 1944”  (Mladenov  2014:  46).  In  such  a  context  of  rapid
development and not before many arguments with James, Peirce started using the term
‘pragmaticism’ to designate his method for deriving meaning, zealously trying to protect
it from misinterpretations and abuse “in the merciless way that words have to expect
when they fall into literary clutches” (CP 5.414). The reason for the invention of the
new name is debatable, but his motives are discernible from his harsh criticism of the
pragmatists following James’s vision for a theory of truth and their implicit disregard for
the normative character of logic. Peirce envisioned pragmatism as a logical, or rather
semeiotic, method for discerning the meaning of intellectual conceptions (e.g. symbols
and arguments). For that reason he refused to accept that it could be reduced to the
‘will to believe’ and the consequent grounding of logic in psychology.
3 As Christopher Hookway aptly stresses in his The Pragmatic Maxim,  from his earliest
publications in the 1860s to his unpublished manuscripts from the early years of the
20th century  Peirce  insisted  that  “information  from  psychology  and  other  natural
sciences  had  no  relevance  to  research  in  logic”  (Hookway  2012:  83).  For  Peirce
psychology  is  a  discipline  studying  how  we  think,  thus  belonging  to  the  domain  of
ἰδιοσκοπία, or the field of cognition relying on special observations. His logic conceived
as semeiotic, on the other hand, was concerned with how we should or ought to think thus
falling within the domain of κοινοσκοπία, or the field of cognition based on the shared
experience  of  humanity.  This  anti-psychologism  as  regards  logic  and  the  other
normative sciences of  esthetics  and ethics represents a  stable tendency throughout
Peirce’s  oeuvre.  In  his  Harvard  lectures  of  1865  Peirce  argues  that  the  failings  of
psychologistic approaches to logic have been consistently shown by philosophers of the
Kantian stripe and that “we ought to adopt a thoroughly unpsychological view of logic”
(W  1:  164).  In  his  “Lessons  in  Practical  Logic”  he  declares  that  “all  questions  of
psychology are […] irrelevant to the science of logic” (W 2: 349). He further stresses that
“all the psychology in the world will leave the logical question just where it was” (EP 2:
217), denies that “the phenomena that psychologists discover have any bearing upon
the theory of reasoning” (EP 2: 385) and asserts that all attempts to ground logic in
psychology are “essentially shallow” (CP 5.28). These are only a few of Peirce’s attacks
on the different attempts to ground logic on psychology. What is the reason for Peirce’s
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insistence to employ a non-psychological notion of logic? Hookway gives the following
answer:
Peirce claims that  if  we are to make external  criticisms of  our current ways of
thinking,  we  have  to  recognize  possible  thoughts,  ones  that  currently  have  no
psychological role in our beliefs and reasoning. We understand such thoughts by
identifying  their  logical  properties.  Hence  normative  criticism  of  thought  and
inference requires an objective or logical conception of thought. (Hookway 2012:
101; original emphasis)
4 In Peirce’s own terminology these so called ‘possible thoughts’ are named would-be’s.
Peirce explains that “no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up
the meaning of a ‘would-be’” (EP 2: 402) and adds that “no collection whatever of single
acts,  though it  were ever so many grades greater than a simple endless series,  can
constitute a would-be, nor can the knowledge of single acts, whatever their multitude,
tell us for sure of a would-be” (CP 2.667). 
But there are two remarks to be made; first, that in the case under consideration a
person is supposed to be in a condition to assert what surely would be the behavior
of  the  subject  throughout  the  endless  series  of  occasions  –  a  knowledge  which
cannot have been derived from reasoning from its behavior on the single occasions;
and second, that that which in our case renders it true, as stated, that the person
supposed “ipso facto knows a would-be of that subject,” is not the occurrence of the
single acts, but the fact that the person supposed “was in condition to assert what
would  surely  be the  behavior  of  the  subject  throughout  an  endless  series  of
occasions. (CP 2.667; original emphasis)
5 Peirce explained in depth his logical anti-psychologism in his projected but unfinished
The Minute Logic (see CP 2.18-78) and Hookway was among various commentators to
further explicate Peirce’s aversion to grounding logic on psychology. For that reason it
seems more productive to follow a different line of thought in approaching a wider
meaning of habit that goes beyond the level of empirical psychology. More accurately, I
will focus on the evolutionary use of the term, which represents another feature of
Peirce’s  criticism  of  the  customary  meaning  of  psychologism  from  a  metaphysical
perspective. Paradoxically a good starting point would be a pshychologistic treatment
of the concept.
6 It  is  difficult  to  establish  whether  Peirce  wanted  to  completely  disregard  the
nominalistic,  or  rather  psychologistic,  branches  of  pragmatism by  inventing  a  new
name for his method focusing not only on actual but on all conceivable thoughts (the
would-be’s  in  question) or  simply  to  stress  his  own  version  as  belonging  to  a
philosophical  movement  quite  heterogeneous  in  its  origin  but  still  devoted  to  the
overcoming  of  the  mind-body  split  of  Cartesianism.  Nonetheless,  it  is  a  fact  that
‘pragmaticism’ looks for its application not on simple terms and propositions, but on
complex intellectual  concepts  and arguments,  which function as  beliefs  or  habits  of
thought.  For  Peirce  belief is  only  an  instance  of  the  general  concept  of  habit.  The
meaning of those terms was central to the newly emerging pragmatic movement since
its birth in the 1870s in the Metaphysical Club formed in Cambridge, in which the ideas
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What Does the Metaphysical Club Believe In?
7 The influence of one of the founding fathers of modern day psychology Alexander Bain
on pragmatist thought has often been underestimated. However, his idea of belief as
that upon which a person is prepared to act was widely discussed among the members
of the Metaphysical Club. Influenced by philosophers such as Thomas Reid (1710-96),
Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) and his close friend John Stuart Mill (1806-73), Bain
developed positions that led him to the idea that questions regarding feeling, sensation
and perception cannot be an object of study for metaphysicians. He was convinced that
the inner workings of the human mind should be approached solely with the methods
of empirical psychology. In his treatise The Emotions and the Will (1859) Bain argues that
belief has meaning only in relation to action and adds that the essence of belief is the
“expectation of  some contingent  future  about  to  follow on our  action”  (Bain  1859:
568-9). According to Peirce, this idea was introduced in the Metaphysical Club by the
lawyer Nicholas St. John Green (1830-76), although Louis Menand argues that the true
source was James Fitzjames Stephen’s (1829-94) book A General View of the Criminal Law
in  England  (1863)  (Menand  2001:  225).  Stephen,  like  Bain,  argued  that  all  action
presupposes a belief and that successful conduct is based on true beliefs. It is a short
step from here to the conclusion that without beliefs one would not be able to initiate
action, whereas without true beliefs successful conduct would be impossible.
[…] the ultimate reason for believing is, that without belief men cannot act. And the
reason  for  believing  what  is  true  is,  that  without  true  belief  they  cannot  act
successfully;  thus  the  advantage  derived  from  true  as  distinguished  from  false
belief, and not the bare fact that the thing is true, is the reason for believing what is
true […] If all the affairs of life, moral and intellectual education included, could be
conducted as well by a person who believed that twice two make six, as by one who
believed that twice two make four, there would be no reason for believing the one
proposition rather than the other. Hence, belief is not mere impression which the
mind receives passively from contemplation of facts external to it, but an active
habit involving an exertion of will. (Stephen 1863: 242)
8 Disagreements  over  the  true  inspiration  for  the  introduction  of  belief  into  the
discussions  of  the  Club  still  exist,  but  Peirce  maintained  that  Bain  was  one  of  the
precursors of pragmatic thought. Even if Green was not familiar with Bain’s works, the
same cannot  be  said  about  James  who  taught  psychology  at  Harvard  based  on  his
theories,  or  about  other  members  of  the  Club  such  as  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  Jr.
(1841-1935), Chauncey Wright (1830-75) and Peirce who all cited Bain. Their analyses of
Bain’s works might be defined as an attempt of the early pragmatists to go beyond the
Cartesian heritage of modernity. Opposing Descartes’s maxim of universal doubt and
his epistemological skepticism, the members of the Club were seeking a way out of the
mind-body dualism by arguing that all action is based on belief from which it follows
like in a logical syllogism a consequent arises from a premise. Thus, pragmatism from
its birth disregards universal doubt as a meaningless principle. The reason is that the
sceptic cannot initiate goal-directed and controlled action before at least some of her
initial  beliefs  which  were  doubted  are  restored.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  Bain’s
psychological philosophy has been a major influence for the pragmatic movement.
9 An interesting fact is the negligence of the Metaphysical Club’s members, Peirce being
the  only  exception,  to  acknowledge  in  a  written  text  or  a  public  statement  Bain’s
influence  on  the  birth  of  pragmatism.  On  the  other  hand,  Bain  himself  never
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commented on the works of Peirce, James and the other Cambridge intellectuals. In the
beginning of the new century Peirce commented on the progress of the new philosophy
and diligently  recorded all  scholars  worth mentioning.  As  for  the relation between
belief and habit, it seems that Bain was the most deserving and Peirce seems to reach
the same conclusion when he writes that pragmatism is a natural consequence from
the definition of belief as “that upon which a man is prepared to act” (CP 5.12). Max
H. Fisch argues that it was only in 1907 when Peirce made the connection between his
method and Bain (Fisch 1954: 413).  Confirming the validity of Peirce’s ‘story’ of the
birth of pragmatism should, however, be examined in relation to other facts such as the
relative ‘silence’ in regard to Bain by other early pragmatists and Bain’s own lack of
comment on the development of pragmatism. Moreover, the only earlier mention of
Bain  and  pragmatism  in  a  single  sentence  discovered  by  Fisch  was  by  the  British
Hegelian Francis Bradley (1846-1924) in his article “On Truth and Practice,” in which he
has taken a rather critical stance towards Schiller’s version of pragmatism.
It would […] be interesting to know how our new gospel [i.e. pragmatism] conceives
its relation to Dr. Bain’s theory of belief. It might seem to have taken that theory,
and, without considering the objections to which it is liable, to have gone beyond it
by simply writing “truth” for “belief.” (Bradley 1904: 314-5)
10 In order to fully appreciate the intended meaning of the concept habit a careful study of
Bain’s  influence  over  the  early  development  of  pragmatism  is  needed.  A  possible
approach would be to follow closely the structure of Fisch’s article “Alexander Bain and
the Genealogy of Pragmatism.” In this way I will  elaborate on the content of Bain’s
theory  of  belief,  examine  its  influence  on  the  Metaphysical  Club’s  members  and
indicate what Peirce ‘borrowed’ from Bain.
 
Bain’s Pragmatism
11 The most provoking as well as the most controversial part of Bain’s works – The Senses
and the  Intellect  (1855)  and The Emotions  and the  Will  later  combined into The Mental
Sciences (1868) – is the proposed theory of belief. His ideas mark a decisive divergence
from  those  of  James  Mill  (1773-1836)  and  John  Stuart  Mill,  who  conceived  belief
respectively as an inseparable association of ideas, which once established in the mind
cannot be removed thereupon, and as a sort of ‘deposited’ meaning, brought about by a
multitude of connections among various concepts, which the mind has compiled. Bain,
on the  other  hand,  considered  belief  as  a  disposition  to  act.  His  main  goal  was  to
describe more fully the process of association of ideas in the mind, while at the same
time transforming the associationists’ doctrines in such a way as to found their bases in
physiology and to postulate the existence of an innate activity of mind. According to
Bain, anyone who thinks of belief as an inseparable association of ideas is making a
serious mistake.
The prevailing error on this subject consists in regarding Belief as mainly a fact of
the Intellect, with a certain participation of the feelings. The usual assumption is,
that  if  a  thing is  conceived in  a  sufficiently  vivid  manner,  or  if  two things  are
strongly associated in the mind, the state of belief is thereby induced. (Bain in Mill
1869: 394)1
12 Nobody can deny that feelings and intellectual vigor play a part in belief, yet they do
not capture its essence. Belief is first and foremost growth and development of the
active  nature  of  the  human mind,  i.e.  an effect  of  the  will.  The tendency of  living
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organisms  to  act  is  manifested  in  a  variety  of  instances  depending  on  certain
conditions,  which  assume the  form of  beliefs,  desires  or  intentions.  If  an  action  is
spontaneously  initiated,  it  will  find  its  spontaneous  effect  in  case  it  eliminates  an
external  irritation or  if  it  brings  pleasure to  the individual. Notwithstanding,  Fisch
argues  that  it  “is  when  actions  indifferent  in  themselves  are  carried  through  in
anticipation of  a  subsequent  fruition,  that  the will exhibits  the complication called
belief” (Fisch 1954:  419).  For Bain a belief  is  measured according to two principles:
motor and emotional. Based on this dichotomy, he infers that the highest degree of
belief is achieved when the individual mind manages to pursue mediate goals with the
same energy invested in achieving final goals and that mind is as satisfied at achieving
them as if a final goal were reached. For that reason, belief would be an empty word if it
is not studied in relation to action. It is of great importance to understand that here
Bain  follows  the  classical  Aristotelian  division  between  potentiality  and  actuality
corresponding to two distinct mental states.
Every one recognizes the old distinction of potentiality and actuality (posse and esse)
as a true account of two states of mind that we practically assume. Besides actually
doing a thing, we know what it is to be in an attitude or disposition of preparedness
to act, before the emergency has arisen, or while the emergency is still at a distance
and uncertain. (Bain 1859: 595)
13 Even if  certain situations or events never happen, the belief  would stay intact as a
readiness to act in case the opportunity for its realization arises. In her life every person
develops many beliefs, which adapt her to the environment. This is obviously true for a
person  belonging  to  a civilized  society,  in  which  personal  development  is  always
intimately  connected  with  some  sort  of  institutional  indoctrination.  However, the
probability  of  actualizing a  great  many of  the acquired beliefs  remains  little.  Fisch
emphasizes  that  the  readiness  to  act  is  always  potentially  present  and  that  this
“readiness constitutes the belief” (Fisch 1954: 420). Yet, by comparing belief with habit,
it should be added that Bain does not include the same meaning which is called upon by
the ancient Greek term ἕξις or the scholastic habitus, which will be examined on the
following  pages.  However,  for  a strong  adept  of  ancient  and  medieval  scholastic
philosophy such as Peirce those terms better represent the potential readiness to act
than a mere psychological investigation of habits.
The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established
in our nature some habit which will determine our actions […] Belief does not make
us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain
way, when the occasion arises. (CP 5.371-3)
14 Bain is closest to pragmatism and to Peirce in particular when he opposes belief to
doubt. The lack of a belief is not a mental state opposite to the state of having a belief,
but  simply  a  belief  in  something  else.  The  true  opposite  is  a  state  of  doubt  and
uncertainty. Whereas belief ensures subjective certainty in the accomplishment of a
particular  goal  and  leads  to  a  gratifying  state  of  mind,  doubt  causes  a  state  of
inconvenience and uneasiness in the individual. Based on such notions Bain draws the
conclusion that every person aims at upholding a state of belief, overcoming in such a
way  the  effects  of  anxiety  caused  by  doubting.  Experience  and  emotion  might
participate in the formation of mental habits in this respect, but the true source of
belief is mainly the characteristic “primitive credulity” of the human intellect (Bain
1859: 582). Accumulated experience does not beget beliefs, but rather it corrects them
and makes them general. To generate a new belief the individual has to experience a
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surprise, which would in turn create a feeling of uncertainty and doubt. Only after this
uncomfortable experience is superseded can we speak of the establishment of a new
belief.
We  are  all  faith  at  the  outset;  we  become  sceptics  by  experience,  that  is,  by
encountering checks and exceptions. We begin with unbounded credulity, and are
gradually educated into a more limited reliance. (Bain 1868: 382)
15 Bain thinks of belief as a predisposition to follow a certain pattern in actions with a
formal  structure that  reflects  something already experienced in the anticipation of
achieving similar results. It follows that belief always contains an intellectual element,
i.e. it is always reasonable to an extent and presupposes some regulatory principle. This
seems to imply that the external universe is rational and that it serves as a basis for
controlled action. In case one encounters an unexpected obstacle,  the continuity of
action  is  breached.  As  a  result,  a  break  in  the  conceptual  scheme  formed  by  the
individual  occurs,  accompanied by a state of  surprise and disappointment from the
inadequate expectation. This state negates the preceding belief, which could only be
reinstated in a modified version to reflect the novelty brought by experience. These
remarks serve to close the discussion on the content of Bain’s theory and to turn to the
presence of that theory in the works of the early pragmatists.
16 Apart from James, who used Bain’s treatises in his academic lectures in psychology and
philosophy, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Chauncey Wright were two other important
members of the Metaphysical Club, who adopted much of the theory of belief in their
own works. It is an interesting fact, one that has not been studied enough, that the Club
was composed almost exclusively of lawyers. One of them was Holmes, who would later
become Supreme Judge and a leading theoretician of law with his doctrine of ‘legal
pragmatism.’ By the early 1870s Holmes had already developed an intricate prognostic
theory of law, which had much in common with Bain’s conception of belief. The theory
was based on the idea of the transformation of customs into laws by accepting new
rules  and  regulations  on  the  part  of  the  court.  According  to  him,  before  such  a
transformative process is fulfilled, a custom functions only as a motive for taking a
particular juridical decision. In such a case the most basic theoretical problem of law is
whether an individual legal decision would influence the outcome of future cases of a
similar type. In societies governed by the rule of law, the will of the sovereign (the
people) is the source of the law. However, those who exercise it – the judges – form the
‘body’ of the law.
The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act? Any motive for their
action, be it constitution, statute, custom, or precedent, which can be relied upon as
likely in the generality of cases to prevail, is worthy of consideration as one of the
sources  of  law,  in  a  treatise  on  jurisprudence.  Singular  motives,  like  the
blandishments  of  the  emperor’s  wife,  are  not  a  ground  of  prediction,  and  are
therefore not considered. (Holmes Jr. 1872: 724)
17 These ideas play a prominent part in the intellectual development of Holmes and they
are more elaborately developed in his lecture “The Path of the Law” (1897), in which
the  object  of  study  for  all  legal  scholarship  is  defined  as  the  “prediction  of  the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts” and law itself
as a body of “dogma or systematized prediction” (Holmes Jr. 1897: 61-2). Unlike Holmes,
Wright  sought  in  Bain’s  theory  of  belief  a  direct  link  to  the  Darwinian  theory  of
evolution and the principles of individual mental development.
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18 Wright attempted a synthesis between Darwin and Bain in order to apply the resulting
conclusions over the problems of consciousness and mind. According to him, cognition
and belief are results of a process of selection, in which only the fittest of them would
have a chance to ‘survive’ and ‘reproduce.’ Among the primal characteristics of mind
Wright points to the ability to reproduce the past through the powers of remembering
and believing.
Among these native faculties of the individual mind is the power of reproducing its
own past experiences in memory and belief; and this is, at least, analogous […] to
the  reproductive  powers  of  physical  organisms,  and  like  these  is  in  itself  an
unlimited, expansive power of repetition. Human beliefs, like human desires, are
naturally illimitable. The generalizing instinct is native to the mind. It is not the
result of habitual experiences, as is commonly supposed, but acts as well on single
experiences,  which  are  capable  of  producing,  when  unchecked,  the  most
unbounded beliefs and expectations of the future. (Wright 1877: 115)
19 For Wright there is a clear analogy between mental processes and the processes of the
physical universe. The formation of habits is then considered as a logical process and
the formal structure of the struggle for survival in the natural world is comparable to
that of a logical inference. For Wright many conceive of belief and habit as mere phases
of  the  development  of  the  individual  mind,  but  Bain’s  greatest  achievement  and
contribution is in reaching the true essence of belief. This is the tendency to act while
trying to accomplish a determined final goal. Such a goal acts as a norm of conduct: as a
horizon which we aim towards following the logical matrix of habit. Thus, habit is not a
singular action and cannot be exhausted by the sum of similar actions; it is rather a rule
of action, almost a necessity, which, however, also includes all potentialities of the will
that might never be actualized: Peirce’s would-be.
20 In contrast to Holmes and Wright, Peirce maintained a more critical stance towards
some hypotheses proposed by Bain. Peirce studied closely the works of Bain and the
utilitarians  Jeremy  Bentham  (1748-1832)  and  Mill,  only  to  reject  the  inherent
nominalism in their  theories.  For him belief  has meaning not simply in relation to
particular action but rather in relation to general concepts. A fundamental principle in
his architectonic philosophy is the idea that the world exists in order to be cognized
and that mind and matter are continuous. To the idea that mind and matter differ not
in essence, but only in degree, and that they are continuous without a sharp boundary
between the two, Peirce gave the name synechism.
The word synechism is the English form of συνεχισμός, from συνεχής, continuous […]
I  have proposed to  make synechism mean the tendency to  regard everything as
continuous […] I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the
whole domain of experience in every element of it. (EP 2: 1)
21 The doctrine of  continuity is  a  direct  consequence of  Peirce’s  evolutionism and his
corresponding metaphysical theory of objective idealism, which argues that the one
intelligible  theory  of  the  universe  is  “that  matter  is  effete  mind,  inveterate  habits
becoming physical laws” (CP 6.24-5). On such a basis Peirce proposed the thesis that
logical conclusions and thinking per se are composed of generalizations, attained by
observations  of  individual  occurrences.  Building  on  that,  Peirce  argues  for  the
acceptance of a level of reality, which encompasses the universe of abstractions. In the
beginning  of  the  20th  century  Peirce  was  considering  the  reality  of  three  logical
universes or modalities: the objects belonging to each he names “Ideas” or “Possibles”
(referring to Firstness, spontaneity, potentiality), “Things” or “Existents” (referring to
Secondness,  determination,  actuality)  and  “Necessitants”  (referring  to  Thirdness,
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habit-taking,  continuity)  (EP 2:  479).  The  mistake  of  nominalism  and  the
psychologization of the term habit is thus the attempt to limit it to the ‘universe’ of
Secondness, actuality, the ‘mechanical’ sum of singular actions. 
22 Peirce’s  philosophy  has  undergone  numerous  transformations,  but  one  aspect
remained unchanged:  that  was the desire to go beyond nominalism,  which latently
dictated the development of thought in the 19th century. We can observe such a mental
thrust in the development of his pragmatism and the normative character, ascribed by
him to logic, ethics and aesthetics. If ratiocination is a form of acting, then it is not only
a subject of logic, but also of ethics. Peirce approaches the problem of what a norm is as
an aspect of a relation between phenomena of the real world to goals such as Truth
(logic),  Good (ethics) and Beauty (aesthetics).  Thus,  from a method for deriving the
meaning of a certain concept, manifested in the sum total of its conceivable practical
bearings, Peirce’s pragmatism evolved into a doctrine for establishing the content of
intellectual concepts and their application towards particular goals.
Pragmaticism was originally enounced in the form of a maxim, as follows: Consider
what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects
of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of
your conception of the object. 
I  will  restate  this  in  other  words,  since  ofttimes  one  can  thus  eliminate  some
unsuspected  source  of  perplexity  to  the  reader.  This  time  it  shall  be  in  the
indicative mood, as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists
in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all
the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance
of the symbol (CP 5.438).
23 This evolution of the original method unfolded over a period of several decades, in
which Peirce made numerous discoveries in various fields of research. Without a doubt
one of the most important ideas which he would put to the torch of pragmatism was
that of habit and its relation to evolutionary and mental processes.
 
The Law of Habit
24 The idea of habit as an effect of the transformation of thought into action developed
during the 19th century with the first steps of empirical psychology, which strove to
build  a  theoretical  framework  refuting  the  mind-body  dualism  of  modernity.  How
would modern day psychologists define habit?
[…] a well-learned behavior or automatic sequence of behaviors that is relatively
situation specific and over time has become motorically reflexive and independent
of motivational or cognitive influence – that is,  it is performed with little or no
conscious intent. (APA Dictionary of Psychology, 2015)
25 It  follows  that  habits  have  an  evolutionary  function  at  the level  of  the  individual
consciousness. They adapt the behavior of a person in accordance with the dynamics of
her environment and help maintain a state of equilibrium in her mental states. Habits,
thus, are engaged in the economy of thought via automatizing behavior, which always
follows certain general patterns or models, while preserving enough flexibility within
the concreteness of the context and the specificity of the individual instance.
26 Peirce might accept such definition of habit and its evolutionary-adaptive function for
the individual as long as it applies specifically to empirical psychology. However, for
him habit is an element of every observable phenomenon in the universe. In this case
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the question is whether the principle of habit-formation is operative in processes such
as the expanding of the universe, the evolution of biological organisms and the cultural
and historical  development of humanity.  If  it  is  possible to apply habit  to all  these
phenomena, then it would mean that a purely psychical (not psychological) principle is
operative at all levels of reality. Thus, we would have to deny all forms of determinism
and absolutism because  in  the  realm of  mental  phenomena there  is  an  element  of
spontaneity. It is thanks to spontaneity that novelty emerges, variety is born, old habits
are  modified  and  new  ones  come  into  being.  Moreover,  any  process  contains  the
possibility of mistake, or rather deviation from the norm. For the better part of the
19th  century  scientific  thought  considered  the  laws  of  mechanics  as  absolute  thus
suppressing the role of spontaneity. However, those laws can hardly account for the
heterogeneity of observable phenomena and the processes which give birth to novelty
and growth. Applied in the field of the mental and the cultural they expose their own
insufficiency by using absurd forms of reductionism.
27 Pragmatism, on the other hand, approaches necessity and determination only as effects
of an ongoing, continuous, unlimited and incomplete process of growth. If the idea of
predetermination  has  any  meaning  in  terms  of  evolutionism  it  is  through  the
hypothesis that in every object there is a tendency to develop from a primal state of
pure  spontaneity  into  a  final  state  of  complete  determination  (from  Firstness  to
Secondness via Thirdness). Here I refer to Peirce and his understanding of matter and
mind  as  continuous.  In  this  framework  the  law  of  habit  is  really  operative  in  the
universe, successfully bridging the gap between body and mind.
I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is merely
mind deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process can be
reversed without violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such
reversal. Accordingly, time may have been evolved by the action of habit. (W 8: 387)
28 According to the law everything in the universe acquires habits and as a consequence
becomes determined. Peirce built on this principle his general law of mind, proposed in
“The Law of Mind” (1892). In this text he argues that exact logical analysis of mental
phenomena shows that ideas have a tendency to grow continuously and thus affect
other ideas. In this process they “lose intensity […] but gain generality and become
welded with other ideas” (EP 1: 313). Before continuing the current discussion, I offer a
detour presenting aspects of the development of habit in the history of philosophical
thought. This serves as an illustration of how meaning grows as well as an explanation
of the workings of habit.
 
Habit Develops
29 According to Peirce, any “philosophical doctrine that should be completely new could
hardly  fail  to  prove  completely  false”  (CP  5.11).  Pragmatism  is  indeed  an  original
contribution to the history of philosophy, but key aspects of the doctrine are traceable
to antiquity. Peirce himself jokes that pragmatists of all stripes and schools have simply
assimilated the methods of experimental science, which are nothing more than the old
logical rule of the gospels: “By their fruits ye shall know them” (EP 2: 401, and Matthew
7: 20). The same rule holds true in reference to the concept of habit, which is central to
pragmatism  and  especially  to  Peirce’s  pragmaticism,  regardless  of  whether  we  are
dealing with logic, semeiotic, phaneroscopy or metaphysics.
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30 Aristotle was among the first philosophers to produce a systematic study of habit by
adopting the term ἕξις  from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus.  Transformed into the Latin
habitus the concept was used with similar meanings by Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) and
Duns Scotus (1265-1308) among others. In the tradition of British empiricism and
among the associationists like David Hume (1711-76), John Stuart Mill and Alexander
Bain the term was transformed into the English habit. More accurately, ἕξις and habitus
have also been translated as ‘state,’ ‘possession’ and ‘disposition,’ but habit seems to
offer the greatest heuristic potential as well as the highest degree of generality.
31 Plato’s Theaetetus is a fundamental text in the history of epistemology. Peirce called it
one of the greatest works of ancient thought together with Parmenides and the dialogue
was an inspiration for many thinkers among which Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1954),
who referred to Theaetetus in his Philosophical Investigations (1953). The central question
of  the  dialogue  is  “What  is  knowledge?”  which  is  discussed  in  a  dialogue  between
Socrates  and  the  young  Theaetetus.  After  refuting  all  of  the  answers  proposed  by
Theaetetus, Socrates himself is careful not to give a definite answer to the question he
raised.  Instead,  the  problem  is  metaphorically  approached:  Socrates  argues  that
knowledge is in fact having or possessing knowledge (Plato 1921: 205 [197, b]). Plato
uses the word ἑξιν,  from which Aristotle would derive his ἕξις.  According to Plato’s
Socrates there is a difference between possessing knowledge and having acquired the
power  of  using  that  knowledge.  He  uses  two  examples  to  illustrate  his  thesis  to
Theaetetus.
Socrates:  Well,  then,  having  does  not  seem  to  me  the  same  as  possessing.  For
instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it,
we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it […] Now see
whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have
it,  as, for instance, if  a man should catch wild birds – pigeons or the like – and
should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert
that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not […] And yet in
another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them,
since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and
hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases,  and to let
them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit. (Plato 1921: 207 [197, b])
32 Plato conceives knowledge not as a passive state of mind, but as an activity: having
acquired knowledge,  one is  actively  knowing.  Possessing knowledge then means its
controlled  and  willful  exercise.  Moreover,  knowing  is  a  present  potentiality  to  be
applied (the actualization of potentiality),  when the knower decides or is  forced by
necessity.
Knowing is either having in hand knowledge that one has acquired and making real
use […] of it, or having the actual power of taking hold of this knowledge because
one already has it under the hand, exactly as the owner of the doves in the dovecote
has the determinate possibility to take hold of them. In other words […] knowledge
would be either an act, or a power focused in a specific sense; that is to say, an
actual  aptitude,  which Aristotle  will  later  categorise  as  second potentiality  and,
equally, as first actuality […] for example, that of an educated man who is sleeping,
but who completely retains his ability, on waking, to exercise his knowledge in a
very specific domain and in a very specific sense. (Rodrigo 2011: 10-1)
33 This example points to the relative overlap between Plato’s and Aristotle’s usage of
habit.  However,  Aristotle’s  ἕξις  attracts  more  meanings  in  its  orbit,  which  vary
according to the context. In his ethical writings he defines virtues as habits, which split
into moral and intellectual. In Physics habits expand even further to include physical
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states, caused by changes in the bodily features of a person. In On the Soul Aristotle
defines  knowledge  as  a  result  of  qualitative  change,  reached  through  repetitive
transition from one state to another. As Fuchs writes, the actualization of knowledge
“represents the development of  an existent quality from potentiality towards fixity
(habit) or  nature”  (Fuchs  1952:  XIV).  This  development  is  possible  thanks  to  the
presence of general concepts in the intellect in relation to the sensory channels. In
Metaphysics  Aristotle  examines  habits  as  properties  or  predispositions,  via which  a
given object manifests its inner tendencies or its ability to enter into a relation with
something else. In Categories habit is considered under the banner of ‘quality.’ 
By “quality” I mean that in virtue of which men are called such and such. The word
“quality” has many senses. Let habits and dispositions here constitute one kind of
quality.  The  former  are  unlike  the  latter  in  being  more  lasting  and  stable.
Comprised among what we call “habits” are virtues and all kinds of knowledge. For
knowledge is considered as lasting and hard to displace from the mind, though a
man may, in fact, have acquired it in only a moderate measure, unless some great
change should come over him, thanks to disease or the like. And the same will hold
good of the virtues – for instance, of temperance, justice. For these are allowed on
all hands to be hard to dislodge or displace. (Aristotle 1962: 63-5 [Cat. 8: 8b])
34 Aristotle also discusses the nature of habits when he examines the category “relation.”
According to him habits, states, sensory impressions and even knowledge are always
relative, i.e. they are such only in relation to something else. Thus, habits are always
habits  for  something  and  knowledge  –  knowing  something.  Aristotle’s  habit  is
dynamical, always directed to the accomplishment of goals and ideals. They in turn are
determined and unchanging, being external to the mind and directing the formation of
the  correct  habits,  i.e.  they  function  as  norms,  final  and  frozen  instants  which  all
movement tries to reach. When we argue that something is ‘good’ we have to say that
this is an instance of the ‘entelechy,’ the principle that guides the transformation of
potentiality into actuality. Habit not only allows one action to be repeated but also, as
Rodrigo remarks, “in actively focusing it, it leads it to be exercised better, and it also
leads it  to realize the fulfilment of  its  object  according to a typical  determination”
(Rodrigo 2014: 14). Aristotle’s conception of habit then is of a universal principle or
better – a phenomenon of generality. A single act is not equivalent to a habit, but only
an actualized instant, which belongs to a class or type. The reason is that the action-
rules of a habit encompass all conceivable states (i.e. potential as well as actual). Habit,
however,  remains  as  a  guiding  matrix,  which  activates  and  translates  into  action,
directed at a certain goal in accordance to some norm. 
35 Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus were among the scholastic philosophers to revive
Aristotle’s  treatment  of  habit  through  the  concept  of  habitus.  For  Aquinas  habits
contain potentiality that is directed at actions (Aquinas 1915: 9-14 [Sum. Th. I-II, q. 49,
a. 3 and q. 50, a. 2]). Habits are a necessary element of the natural order and Aquinas
explains  their  effects by  examining  the  laws  according  to  which  potentialities
transform into actualities. In order to explain knowledge as a result of habit-formation
he assumes the actual presence of general concepts in the intellect (εἶδος or species).
They in turn are cognizable and understandable likenesses of the objects of reality.
Ideas have the same form like things in the material world and are reached through
abstraction of the fancies, i.e. the concrete, individual mental representations. Forming
the substance of the intellect, ideas are directed to the operations of conversion and
remembering.  Aquinas  considers  them  as  habits  as  long  as  they  participate  in  the
predisposition of the individual mind to reproduce knowledge, acquired through the
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will.  According to him the nature of habit  is  intimately connected with the will:  in
other words, all habits are teleological and each is a result of controlled effort. 
Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is
well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously
directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit
whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is
clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit “is that which one
uses when one wills.” (Aquinas 1915: 23-4 [Sum. Th. I-II, q. 50, a. 5])
36 Habits make possible the cognition of reality by preserving themselves in time through
the active power of the will. Fuchs thinks that this interpretation is valid in light of
Aquinas’s idea of the will as “the real subject of virtues viewed as moral habits” (Fuchs
1952: XVI).
37 According to Duns Scotus, habit is a definite predisposition, which is available in the
intellect. He considers some ideas to be characteristics of habits because they enable
mental operations and are more or less lasting qualities, but they are not habits per se.
Habit is the ability to reproduce passed actions and events through repetition. For him,
like for Aquinas, moral virtues are habits, which are ‘present’ in the will, before the will
actualizes  into  concrete  actions. Thus,  habit  exists continuously  as  a  potential  that
preserves and causes a pattern of behavior, enacted by the will. Physical skills are also
considered as manifestations of habit through the continuous repetition of particular
actions, which aim to accomplish an ideal norm.
38 The philosopher whose name most naturally attaches to the idea of habit in modernity
is doubtlessly David Hume. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he argues that
habit and custom – two terms that he considers synonymous (Hume 1900: 43) – are
principles of fundamental importance in human nature. It is only thanks to habit that
we are able to trace and infer logically causal relations between the events we observe,
instead of perceiving them as sequences guided by chance.
Custom, then,  is  the great  guide of  human life.  It  is  that  principle  alone which
renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar
train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence
of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is
immediately present to the memory and senses.  We should never know how to
adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any
effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of
speculation. (Hume 1900: 45)
39 Although this limited presentation of the idea of habit from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,
Duns Scotus and Hume does not cover the rich history of the concept in its entirety, it
does  reveal,  above  all  else,  a  core  of  meanings  with  a  potential  far  exceeding  the
boundaries of empirical psychology. By defining habit as a psychical principle, Peirce
follows a heritage, which gives birth to meanings quite different from Bain’s narrow
understanding of habit as belief. Let us see what habit can do beyond psychological
concerns. This entails to dwell into Peirce’s evolutionism and metaphysics in order to
suggest further possibilities for the development of the concept.
 
Habit beyond Psychology
40 Belief as an instance of habit was among the concepts discussed between the members
of the Metaphysical Club. However, for Peirce habit is a concept that transcends the
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boundaries  of  human  consciousness.  According  to  him,  every  phenomenon  in  the
universe develops from a state of  chaos and indeterminacy to a state of  increasing
determination  guided  by  a  habit-taking  tendency  (or  once  again  from  Firstness  to
Secondness via Thirdness). The most general formulation of evolution given by Peirce
is “growth in the widest sense of that word” (CP 1.174). By growth it is not meant the
mechanical  and quantitative  increase  of  biological  species  or  cultural  artefacts,  for
example, but an increase of the complexity of relations between different elements in a
system  and  the  differentiation  of  the  communicative  channels  between  bordering
systems. In Peirce’s pragmatism a general concept is subordinate to the principles of
evolutionary growth and its meaning is in a process of continuous development of the
relations between its elements and the environment in which they exist. How can we
explain the ever growing variety in the universe? The only possibility is to allow for
spontaneity, which under the influence of habit becomes determinate. For Peirce the
most obvious characteristic of the universe is its heterogeneity, which leads him to the
conclusion that it cannot be a result only of the blind forces of the laws of mechanics,
because this:
[…] is  a philosophy which leaves no room for a God! No,  indeed! It  leaves even
human consciousness, which cannot well be denied to exist, as a perfectly idle and
functionless flâneur in the world, with no possible influence upon anything – not
even upon itself. (CP 1.162)
41 According to Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology, the universe emerged from a pure state
of vagueness (First) and slowly develops to a state of pure determination (Second), and
the mediating process is characterized by an increase of complexity, or rather by a
habit-taking  tendency  (Third).  The  inherent  tendency  of  the  objects  of  reality  to
acquire  habits  is  seen  as  the  dynamical  element  of  a  triadic  relation  in  which
spontaneity and necessity enter. In every manifestation of the universe we can observe
processes of renewal and of repetition, where the transformation of the first into the
second follows a logical succession similar to that of establishing beliefs. Thus, in both
cases we describe the effects of habit. The continuous movement of the universe and its
relative stability in time are major problems approached in Peirce’s metaphysics and
cosmology.  In  it  he  formulates  the  three  principles  of  evolution:  tychism (τύχη  –
chance) or the idea that chance begets order; anancism (ἀνάγκη – necessity) or the idea
that phenomena are relatively determined; and agapism (ἀγάπη – love) or the idea that
evolution is teleological and all phenomena acquire habits through the power of love
and compassion.
Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; evolution by fortuitous
variation, evolution by mechanical necessity; and evolution by creative love. We
may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm,  anancastic evolution, or anancasm,
and  agapastic  evolution,  or  agapasm. The  doctrines  which  represent  these  are
severally of  principle importance,  we may term them tychasticism,  anancasticism,
and agapasticism. (EP 1: 362)
42 Peirce  developed  the  idea  of  evolution  as  an  interplay  between  chance  variations,
mechanical necessity and creative love (which roughly correspond to the evolutionary
theories  of  Darwin,  Wallace/Spencer  and  Lamarck  respectively)  in  his  essay
“Evolutionary Love” (1893). He finds the results of tychastic evolution in the increase
and endless variations of living organisms and cultural practices. However, the most
important aspect of tychasm is the suggestions that chance and spontaneity beget order
by the acquisition of habits. This means that an evolutionary stance should be assumed
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in regards to all  phenomena in the world,  including physical  laws which grow and
develop.  The  proposition  that  order  comes  out  of  spontaneity  was  diametrically
opposed to the prevalent ideas of determinism in the 19th century,  but it  has been
extremely influential to modern day chaos theories. A century after Peirce’s death the
Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003) wrote that:
[…]  Peirce’s  metaphysics  was  considered  as  one  more  example  of  a  philosophy
alienated from reality. But, in fact, today Peirce’s work appears to be a pioneering
step toward understanding of the pluralism involved in physical laws. (Prigogine &
Stengers 1984: 303)
43 Agapastic evolution is discernible not only in the domain of metaphysics, but also of
physics: its effects can be observed in the evolution of social and mental phenomena.
Moreover,  agapasticism,  which  is  an  aspect  of  a  philosophy  of  habit,  can  be
instrumentalized into a method for social,  political and institutional reforms that is
mediating progressivism and conservativism. As an example we should only mention
Peirce’s  essays  “Why  Do  We  Punish  Criminals?”  and  “Dmesis”  (1892),  in  which  he
developed a method of applied agapasm for the reeducation of criminals in order to
prove the logical validity of the Christian doctrine that God is love. Moreover, to fully
appreciate the role of habit  beyond psychology a thorough investigation of Peirce’s
logic (semeiotic), his classification of signs and his triadic conception of the interpretant
ought to be conducted.
 
Is Habit Universally Valid?
44 There is one question with regard to habit that persists. Namely, is the law of habit
universal?  We  should  not  succumb  to  the  temptation  to  consider  the  universal  as
synonymous to the absolute. The law of habit-taking is universal in the sense that it
guides processes in the mental as well as in the material universe. However, it is not
absolute because it allows innumerable deviations of the smallest degree, which in turn
give rise to endless variation and unlimited evolution.
The  hypothesis  suggested  […]  is  that  all  laws  are  results  of  evolution;  that
underlying all other laws is the only tendency which can grow by its own virtue, the
tendency of all things to take habits. Now since this same tendency is the one sole
fundamental law of mind, it follows that the physical evolution works towards ends
in the same way that mental action works towards ends, and thus in one aspect of
the matter it would be perfectly true to say that final causation is alone primary.
Yet, on the other hand, the law of habit is a simple formal law, a law of efficient
causation; so that either way of regarding the matter is equally true, although the
former is more fully intelligent. Meantime, if law is a result of evolution, which is a
process lasting through all time, it follows that no law is absolute. That is, we must
suppose that the phenomena themselves involve departures from law analogous to
errors of observation. (CP 6.101)
45 If a person learns anything new urged by her own ignorance, i.e. by making mistakes,
can we suggest that the universe – to the extent that it is itself mindfull and meaning-
laden – is in a perpetual process of learning itself? The action of habit can be seen as an
actualization  of  the  depositories  of  memory,  the  guiding  principle  for  conserving
knowledge  through  association,  and  yet  flexible  enough  to  allow  dissociations  and
newly emerging associations. In the context of the universality of habit as overcoming
the  mind-body  dualism of  modern  philosophy,  the  psychologism/anti-psychologism
divide seems to be one more instance of that “obsolete Cartesian dualism” (CP 6.580)
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that renders mind and matter two distinct substances.  The divide itself  comes as a
result of an attempt to approach the human mind as distinct from the physical universe
in which it came to existence. Thus, the epistemological dilemma: do we look for the
universal  laws  of  logic  ‘outside’  the  human  mind  or,  on  the  contrary,  ‘within’  the
limited scope of human consciousness? Peirce’s evolutionary philosophy of synechism 
and objective idealism through the concept of habit offers a third way, the postmodern
way to use the words of the late John Deely, which conceives of the human mind and
the universe as continuous.
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NOTES
1. The quote is from James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, which was published
in 1869 with comments by Bain and John Stuart Mill.
ABSTRACTS
In the following text I  reexamine the connotations of the term habit  from the perspective of
Peirce’s pragmatism. I  start by tracing back the roots of the term in the Metaphysical Club’s
discussions of Alexander Bain’s theory of belief. By stressing the relative overlap between belief and
habit I am also proposing that the latter term transcends the boundaries of empirical psychology.
Peirce’s well-known antipathy to psychologism in logic raised the status of habit to a universal
concept that participates in the unlimited process of interpretation. Habit, therefore, falls into a
new lineage of meaning that can be traced back to antiquity and turns into a generative notion
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with extensive connotations. As a result it becomes an inseparable part of Peirce architectonic
philosophy,  capable  to  shed  new  light  on  his  evolutionary  cosmology  and  metaphysics.
Conceiving of habit as an operative element in the evolution of all phenomena in the universe is
the main objective of this article.
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